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NOTE
PRESERVING A RACIAL HIERARCHY:
A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE DISPARATE RACIAL
IMPACT OF LEGACY PREFERENCES IN UNIVERSITY
ADMISSIONS
Kathryn Ladewski*
Many public and private universities around the country employ
legacy admissions preferences in order to give children of alumni
special consideration in the admissions process. Such preferences
disproportionately benefit white applicants at the cost of their non-
white counterparts, because past generations of college students
were less diverse than today's applicant pool. However, universities
argue that their legacy preferences are justified because they assist
in alumni fundraising efforts. This Note presents a statistical analy-
sis to argue that legacy preferences are prohibited by the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 because they have a discriminatory effect on mi-
nority college applicants and have not been shown to promote (and
do not promote) any legitimate university purpose.
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INTRODUCTION
"Of all the aspirations that make up the American Dream, perhaps the most
important is the opportunity to go to college."
-Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sen. Tom Carper,
and Gov. Tom Vilsack'
Social mobility is one of the hallmarks of American society. The Ameri-
can Dream is one in which people of all backgrounds, with hard work and a
little bit of luck, can be successful. One component of this "dream" is inter-
generational social mobility and the idea that the opportunities of future
generations are not limited by the past.2 Access to higher education is a key
component of intergenerational social mobility, and historically it has been
one way for vulnerable groups, such as immigrants and minorities, to
achieve greater prosperity.' Legacy preferences, which give an admissions
"boost" to university applicants whose parents or grandparents attended a
particular institution,4 run counter to intergenerational social mobility be-
cause they allow the composition of past generations of university students
to influence the composition of future generations of students.5 In addition,
legacy preferences disproportionately benefit white university applicants,
6whose parents are more likely to have attended American universities.
Legacy policies were first implemented in the 1920s as a mechanism for
excluding Jewish students and other immigrants from university admission.
Since that time, legacy policies have become widespread at public and pri-
vate universities across the United States. The justification for such legacy
policies has changed over time-they are now intended to promote institu-
tional loyalty and increase alumni volunteerism and donation rates, rather
than to disadvantage certain groups of applicants.' Despite this changing
purpose, legacy policies continue to have a negative effect on the admissions
1. Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sen. Tom Carper & Gov. Tom Vilsack, Saving the Ameri-
can Dream, BLUEPRINT MAG. (Democratic Leadership Council, Wash. D.C.), July 22, 2006,
available at http://www.ndol.org/ndol-ci.cfmkaid= 137&subid--9001 II&contentid=253992.
2. See, e.g., Carlton F.W. Larson, Titles of Nobility, Hereditary Privilege, and the Unconsti-
tutionality of Legacy Preferences in Public School Admissions, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1375, 1381-82
(2006).
3. Marcia G. Synnott, The Admission and Assimilation of Minority Students at Harvard,
Yale, and Princeton, 1900-1970, 19 HIST. EDoC. Q. 285, 285 (1979).
4. Cameron Howell & Sarah E. Turner, Legacies in Black and White: The Racial Composi-
tion of the Legacy Pool, 45 RES. IN HIGHER EDUC. 325, 325-26 (2004).
5. See id. at 330-31.
6. John D. Lamb, The Real Affirmative Action Babies: Legacy Preferences at Harvard and
Yale, 26 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 491, 508 (1993).
7. For a discussion of the history of legacy preferences, see infra Part I.
8. See infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
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prospects of immigrant and minority applicants, whose parents are less
likely to have attended college in the United States.9
This Note argues that legacy admissions policies are impermissible un-
der the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits universities receiving
federal funds from promulgating policies that have a racially disparate im-
pact, unless those policies actually promote a legitimate purpose.'0 Part I
presents a brief history of legacy admissions policies in American higher
education. Part II describes the negative impact that legacy preferences have
on minority applicants. Part III presents a statistical analysis of university
fundraising data to show that legacy preferences do not have a positive ef-
fect on university fundraising. Part IV argues that because legacy
preferences have a disparate racial impact and do not further a legitimate
purpose, their use at universities receiving federal funds is impermissible
under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
I. THE HISTORY OF LEGACY PREFERENCES
The first legacy preferences in the United States were put in place in the
1920s," during an era of increasing selectivity at the university level and
increasing nativism at the national level. 12 Many universities increased their
selectivity at this time because they faced dramatically increasing enroll-
ments as veterans returned from World War 1.'3 Admissions policies at these
universities were not equipped to limit the number of admitted students,
because until this time even the most prestigious universities had admitted
all students that possessed the requisite academic qualifications.
4
9. See infra Part II.
10. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 states, "No person in the United States shall, on the ground
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance'" 42
U.S.C. § 2000d (2006); see also 34 C.F.R. § 100.3 (2009); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n,
463 U.S. 582, 591 (1983) (holding that disparate impact discrimination in the employment context
is prohibited by the Title VI implementing regulations). Guardians was expressly extended beyond
employment discrimination in Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775
F.2d 1403 (11 th Cir. 1985).
11. See MARCIA GRAHAM SYNNOTT, THE HALF-OPENED DOOR: DISCRIMINATION AND AD-
MISSIONS AT HARVARD, YALE, AND PRINCETON, 1900-1970, at 154 (1979). This book contains an
excellent discussion of the relationship between anti-Jewish sentiment and admissions restrictions at
Yale and, more generally, other elite universities, as does DAN A. OREN, JOINING THE CLUB: A
HISTORY OF JEWS AND YALE 40 (2d ed. 2000). Restrictions on Jewish enrollment may be considered
racial discrimination, which is the focus of this Note, if Jews were considered a separate race at the
time the policy was implemented. See Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617
(1987) (under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2006)).
12. SYNNOTT, supra note 11, at 13-14. "Nativism" refers to hostility toward immigrants and
efforts to protect Americans from foreigners residing in the United States. See, e.g., BRIAN N. FRY,
NATIVISM AND IMMIGRATION: REGULATING THE AMERICAN DREAM 2 (2007).
13. SYNNOTT, supra note 11, at 13-14.
14. See id. at 201 ("Before World War 11, children of middle- and upper-class families, pre-
dominantly Anglo-Saxon Protestant, had found it relatively easy, if they possessed minimum
academic qualifications, to be admitted to the elite colleges and professional schools."); HAROLD S.
WECHSLER, THE QUALIFIED STUDENT 4 (1977).
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In response to rising enrollments, many universities decided to increase
selectivity as a mechanism for limiting the size of each freshman class. This
decision coincided with an increase in nativist sentiment at the national
level, which was in part due to the social and political effects of World War
." Anti-immigrant sentiment was often directed at Jews, many of whom
were recent arrivals from Russia and Eastern Europe,16 and this anti-Jewish
sentiment was widespread on university campuses.17
Universities on the East Coast were particularly concerned about their
increased Jewish enrollments." Such universities addressed the dual "prob-
lems" of general overenrollment and objectionable levels of Jewish
enrollment by increasing selectivity in their admissions processes and,
within those processes, implementing mechanisms designed to exclude Jew-
ish applicants in particular.' 9 After an embarrassing incident at Harvard
resulting from a proposal to explicitly discriminate against Jewish appli-
cants,2° administrators at Yale decided to restrict Jewish admissions in a
more covert and politically acceptable manner.2' Yale's plan to address both
its overpopulation and its Jewish enrollment began to take shape in 1923;22
15. SYNNOr, supra note 11, at 14.
16. OREN, supra note 11, at 21,40.
17. SYNNOTT, supra note 11, at 34-35.
18. OREN, supra note 11, at 42-44.
19. SYNNOTr, supra note 11, at 16-19.
20. Harvard's President Lowell was determined to limit the number of Jewish students, ei-
ther through an outright quota or explicitly higher academic standards for Jewish students. Despite
having significant support among the faculty, Lowell's proposal was eventually defeated by a faculty
vote. The situation generated enormous negative press and made it impossible for Harvard to adopt
the less overtly discriminatory policies that were becoming commonplace in other elite Eastern
universities. For a detailed discussion of Harvard's attempts to restrict the number of Jewish stu-
dents, see JEROME KARABEL, THE CHOSEN 86-109 (2005). See also OREN, supra note 11, at 49-52.
21. OREN, supra note 11, at 50.
22. Id. at 54-55. Yale President Angell wrote to his counterpart at Williams College that "our
Harvard friends have been passing through a rather unpleasant experience as a result of their discus-
sion of methods of discouraging Hebrew patronage." Id. at 54. Ensuring that their deliberations were
conducted with secrecy and caution, administrators at Yale discussed limitations on Jewish enroll-
ment through an English test, a reduced cap on scholarship aid, and the requirement of personal
interviews for local applicants (because many of Yale's Jewish students were from the New Haven
area). Id. at 48, 52-53. Yale's plan to address both its overpopulation and its Jewish enrollment took
shape in 1923 in a policy called the "Limitation of Numbers." Id. at 55. According to the Yale ad-
missions committee, "the fixing of a maximum number of Freshmen admitted seem[ed] a necessary
basis for any restrictions which have to do with character rather than with scholarship." Id. at 56.
The Dean of Freshmen agreed that a limitation on the number of freshmen "might give some ground
for tackling the race question.' Id. at 55. The plan promulgated in 1923 included a cap of 850
freshmen and a reduction in scholarship aid. Race itself would only be a factor in admitting "mar-
ginal" applicants, who would be required to pass a character test. It was widely assumed that Jewish
applicants would fare worse on such character tests. Id. at 59. However, the first class at Yale admit-
ted under the new policy did not show a significant drop in the number of Jewish students, so
between 1924 and 1926, Yale implemented a series of more creative strategies, including legacy
preferences, a cap on the number of transfer students (many of whom were Jewish), and an SAT
requirement. Id. at 59-60. After implementation of these policies, the percentage of Jewish students
at Yale began to drop, and continued to decline well into the 1930s as new admissions questions
were periodically added to keep Jewish enrollment in check. SYNNOTT, supra note 11, at 155-56.
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this plan eventually included the promulgation of the nation's first legacy
admissions preference in 1925.23
Since Yale first introduced legacy preferences in 1925, such policies
have become widespread in both public and private universities across the
nation. In 1992, 16% of public institutions and 21% of private institutions
employed some form of legacy preference. As of 2003, legacies comprised
10-15% of the student body at Ivy League schools and up to 23% of the
students at other major institutions. Legacy applicants are said to receive a
"nudge" in the admissions process, meaning that, all else equal, they are
26admitted over nonlegacy students. A former Stanford dean of admissions
explained that during her tenure at Stanford, applicants were placed into
three categories, corresponding to deny, further consideration, and admit;
27legacy status effectively moved the applicant up one category.
Although not all universities provide such a concrete explanation of their
legacy preferences, legacy status at many universities significantly affects an
applicant's chances for admission. At Stanford, the legacy admit rate in
1990 was almost twice the 22.2% rate for applicants overall." Similarly, at
23. OREN, supra note 11, at 59. The preference was explained as ensuring that the "limitation
on numbers shall not operate to exclude any son of a Yale graduate who has satisfied all the re-
quirements for admission." Id.
24. HUNTER M. BRELAND ET AL., CHALLENGES IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 72 (1995).
25. Daniel Golden, Family Ties: Preference for Alumni Children in College Admission
Draws Fire, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2003, at Al; see also Cameron Howell, "Each Generation in the
Track": Admissions Preferences for Children of Alumni, at 2-3 (Aug. 2004) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Virginia) (on file with author). Today, many elite universities utilize leg-
acy preferences, including Stanford University, Harvard University, Yale University, Princeton
University, University of Pennsylvania, Dartmouth College, Brown University, University of Notre
Dame, Columbia University, Georgetown University, University of Michigan, University of Vir-
ginia, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and Middlebury College. Examples of
universities that do not utilize legacy preferences include the California Institute of Technology
(Caltech) and Texas A&M University, and all public universities in California and Georgia. See
Shikha Dalmia, Free Tuition is No Substitute for Dropping Legacy Admissions, S.F CHRON.,
Mar. 18, 2008, at B7, available at http://www.sfgate.comlcgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/03/17/
EDO3VLHI4.DTL (Caltech); Michael Dannenberg, Editorial, Opposing view: Ban legacy prefer-
ences, USA TODAY, Aug. 20, 2008, available at http://blogs.usatoday.comIoped/2008/08/opposing-
view-b.html (Notre Dame, Harvard, Yale); Golden, supra (public universities in California and
Georgia); Alice Gomstyn, Top Colleges Mum on Legacy Admissions, ABC NEws, Apr. 11, 2008,
http://abcnews.go.comBusiness/Industrylnfo/story?id=4626882&page=l (Harvard, Yale, Princeton,
Stanford, Columbia, Georgetown, Dartmouth, Middlebury, University of Pennsylvania); Alan Gor-
don & Bryan Chang, Privileging the Privileged, COLL. HILL INDEP. (Providence, R.I.),
Apr. 8, 2004, http://www.brown.edu/Students/INDY/alpha/article.php?id=2 I &issueid=188 (Texas
A&M, Brown); Penn Alumni: Alumni Council on Admissions, http://www.alumni.upenn.edu/aca/
legadm.html#whois (last visited July 18, 2009) (University of Pennsylvania); Karl Stampfl, Admis-
sions Nepotism, MICH. DAILY (Ann Arbor, Mich.), Feb. 6, 2008, http://www.michigandaily.com/
content/admissions-nepotism (University of Michigan); Univ. of Va. Alumni Ass'n, Frequently
Asked Questions, http://www.alumni.virginia.edu/admission/liaison/faq/application.aspx (last vis-
ited July 18, 2009) (University of Virginia); UNC General Alumni Ass'n, Frequently Asked
Questions, http://alumni.unc.edu/article.aspx?SID=1839 (last visited July 18, 2009) (University of
North Carolina-Chapel Hill).
26. See Howell, supra note 25, at 10-11.
27. See JEAN H. FETTER, QUESTIONS AND ADMISSIONS: REFLECTIONS ON 100,000 ADMIs-
SIONS DECISIONS AT STANFORD 75 (1995).
28. Id. at 74.
February 2010O]
Michigan Law Review
Harvard, the average legacy admit rate from 1985 to 1992 was 35.7%, over
twice the 16.9% rate for applicants overall. 9 At Yale between 1986 and
1995, 42.5% of legacy applicants were admitted as opposed to 19.4% of
total applicants.30
Comparisons of admissions rates between legacy and nonlegacy appli-
cants may be misleading, however, because legacy applicants are often more
qualified than applicants overall. Even so, one study suggests that, after con-
trolling for SAT scores, legacy status improved an applicant's chances of
acceptance by 25% in 1999."' In fact, disparate admissions rates led the
United States Department of Education Office for Civil Rights to conduct a
study of Harvard's admissions policies in the early 1990s.12 The results of
this study indicated that legacy was a significant factor in the admissions
process based on notes that admissions readers wrote in student application
files. For example, one note read, "Without lineage, there would be little
case. With it, we will keep looking."33 Another read, "We'll need confirma-
tion that dad is a legit, S&S [Alumni Schools and Scholarship Committee
participant] because this is a 'luxury' case otherwise." A third comment
read, "Not a great profile but just strong enough #'s and grades to get the tip
from lineage. 35 The Office for Civil Rights found that "being the son or
daughter of an alumnus of Harvard/Radcliffe was the critical or decisive
factor" in admitting certain applicants, and that applicants whose parents
participate on the "Schools and Scholarship Committee" got a bigger "tip"
36in the admissions process.
Although the nation's first legacy preference was racially motivated,37
universities today justify their legacy preferences based on nondiscrimina-
tory reasons. In general, modem legacy preferences are employed as
methods of encouraging alumni to donate and volunteer on behalf of the
university. Harvard, for example, explained its rationale in terms of main-
taining alumni ties with the university:
Harvard alumni support the college by devoting immense amounts of time
in recruiting and other volunteer activities, by contributing financially, and
by informing other people, be they potential students, parents, donors, or
community leaders, about the College. Those alumni are naturally, [sic]
very interested in the college choices of their own children. If their chil-
29. Lamb, supra note 6, at 503.
30. id. at 505.
31. Howell, supra note 25, at 11-12 (citing JAMES L. SHULMAN & WILLIAM G. BOWEN, THE
GAME OF LIFE: COLLEGE SPORTS AND EDUCATIONAL VALUES (2001)).
32. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, STATEMENT OF FINDINGS, COMPLIANCE
REVIEW No. 01-88-6009, at 27-28 (1990) (on file with author) [hereinafter OCR STATEMENT OF
FINDINGS].
33. Id. at 27.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 28.
36. Id.
37. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
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dren are rejected by Harvard, their affection for and interest in the college
may decline; if their children are admitted, their involvement with the Col-
lege is renewed. Having children share the parent's college affiliation
stimulates those three aspects of contribution: of service, of money, and of
community relations.'s
A former dean of admissions at Stanford explained legacy admissions as a
kind of "mutual benefit" for applicants and universities, as "alumni children
benefit from the connections of their parents; and colleges and universities
benefit from the continued loyalty of the associated alumni, usually through
financial contributions. '"39 Similarly, Dartmouth explained that its legacies
"are given preferential treatment because the college wants to keep alumni
(read: donors) happy."4 Likewise, the University of Virginia's policy is• ,,41,
based on its desire "to keep its alumni happy-and donating. Universities
thus rely heavily on the link between legacy preferences and fundraising in
attempting to justify their use of such preferences.
II. THE RACIAL IMPACT OF LEGACY PREFERENCES
Although defenders of today's legacy preferences argue that the prefer-
ences are needed for fundraising purposes and are not intentionally
discriminatory, such programs have a racially discriminatory effect analo-
gous to that of Yale's original, intentionally discriminatory legacy policy.
42
Because legacy policies improve admissions prospects for alumni children,
the racial composition of students admitted under legacy preferences is nec-
essarily affected by the racial composition of the previous generation of
college students. College students of previous generations were less diverse
than today's applicants, and legacy preferences allow those past enrollments
to influence the current generation of admits. Because legacy preferences
benefit children of alumni, "[t]he racial and ethnic composition of the pool
of potential legacy students necessarily resembles the composition of past
student generations. 43
The disparity between the racial composition of legacy applicants and
the overall applicant pool is apparent today at both public and private
38. OCR STATEMENT OF FINDINGS, supra note 32, at 40.
39. FETrER, supra note 27, at 77-78.
40. Howell & Turner, supra note 4, at 330.
41. Id.
42. For evidence that Yale's original legacy policy was intentionally discriminatory, see
OREN, supra note 11, at 55-60.
43. Howell & Turner, supra note 4 at 346. In addition, legacy preferences continue to "work
against any relative newcomers" and therefore disadvantage today's immigrant groups, just as they
were intended to disadvantage Jewish immigrant applicants when they were originally implemented
at Yale. See OREN, supra note 11, at 59 (discussing the first legacy preference's negative effect on
immigrant populations). As such, legacy admissions preferences historically benefitted-and con-
tinue to benefit-white, nonimmigrant applicants, because past generations of American university
students have been disproportionately white. Although discrimination based on national origin is
also prohibited under the Civil Rights Act, this Note focuses on race rather than national origin. Cf
34 C.F.R. § 100.3(a) (2009) (prohibiting discrimination based on national origin).
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universities that employ legacy preferences. For example, the United States
Department of Education Office for Civil Rights determined that although
Asian Americans made up 15.7% of overall applicants at Harvard between
the years 1985 and 1992, Asian Americans represented only 3.5% of legacy
applicants. 4 Similarly, at the University of Virginia, where black students
made up approximately 10% of entering students in 2002, only 3% of leg-
acy applicants in that same year were black .
Such figures are perhaps unsurprising given that previous generations of
American university students were overwhelmingly white, particularly at
many universities that use legacy preferences.4 At the University of Vir-
ginia, for example, explicit segregation continued into the 1950s and fewer
than 3% of students were minorities as late as 1973.47 At Harvard, each class
year only included five or six black students until the 1960s.4' At the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania, black students represented only 5.7% of
undergraduates as late as 1996.49 Because previous generations of college
students at these and other universities exhibited a relatively high degree of
racial (white) homogeneity, admissions policies that benefit the children of
alumni also tend to disproportionately benefit whites.5 °
Because the negative impact of legacy preferences on minority appli-
cants is based on past patterns of attendance at American universities and
the underrepresentation of such racial groups over that period, the negative
impact of legacy preferences on racial minorities should decrease over time
if the student bodies at American universities continue to diversify. How-
ever, research suggests that it will be some time before the racial
composition of legacy admits mirrors the racial composition of admitted
students overall. At the University of Virginia, for example, where black
students made up 10-12% of the student population in the 2003-04 aca-
demic year, a statistical simulation predicted that black students would not
make up a similar proportion of legacy admits until the year 2020."
Legacy preferences at Harvard help to explain why Asian American ap-
plicants in the early 1990s were admitted less frequently than their white
peers despite having higher academic qualifications. 2 In fact, after removing
legacies and recruited athletes from the sample, the United States Depart-
44. OCR STATEMENT OF FINDINGS, supra note 32, at 35.
45. Howell & Turner, supra note 4, at 340-42.
46. See supra note 25 for a nonexhaustive list of universities that use legacy preferences.
47. Howell & Turner, supra note 4, at 341.
48. Synnott, supra note 3, at 295.
49. The Progress of Admissions of Black Students at the Nation's Highest-Ranked Colleges
and Universities, J. BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC., Autumn 1996, at 6. For information on the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania's current legacy admissions policy, see Penn Alumni: Alumni Council on
Admissions, supra note 25.
50. This assumes that alumni of different races tend to have the same number of children.
51. Howell & Turner, supra note 4, at 326.
52. See, e.g., OCR STATEMENT OF FINDINGS, supra note 32, at 2 (noting Harvard's written
statement that Asian Americans have lower admission rates despite higher academic qualifications).
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ment of Education Office for Civil Rights determined that Asian Americans
were actually admitted at a higher rate than whites for three of the ten years
in the sample.53 In that study, OCR determined that Asian American appli-
cants were admitted at a rate of approximately 4.2 percentage points less
than white applicants (13.2% admit rate for Asian Americans versus 17.4%
for whites). This statistically significant difference in admissions rates was
fully explained by the comparatively low proportion of Asian Americans
who were legacy applicants and recruited athletes, two groups that were
(and are) given an advantage in Harvard's admissions process.55 The experi-
ence of Asian American applicants at Harvard demonstrates that the impact
of legacy preferences is significant enough that it was readily apparent to
applicants and community leaders.
III. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF UNIVERSITY FUNDRAISING DATA
Universities that employ legacy admissions policies generally justify
them as assisting with university fundraising efforts. Despite these universi-
ties' assertions, however, statistical evidence calls into question whether
legacy preferences actually benefit fundraising efforts. This Part presents the
results of a statistical analysis of fundraising data from eight public universi-
ties, all of which have eliminated their legacy admissions policies.56 After
analyzing fundraising data from these universities before and after legacy
preferences were eliminated, this Part concludes that discontinuing legacy
preferences did not harm fundraising outcomes at these universities.
Figures 1 and 2, below, present alumni fundraising data for the eight
universities in this study, for fiscal years 1990-2008.7 The data represent
the total donations from alumni in each year (in dollars). Dashed lines rep-
resent years in which the university admissions policy included legacy
preferences, and solid lines indicate years after the elimination of legacy
preferences.
53. See id.
54. Id. at 36.
55. Id. at 36-37.
56. These universities include six in the University of California system (Berkeley, Davis,
Irvine, Los Angeles, Santa Barbara, and San Diego), all of which eliminated legacy preferences in
1999, as well as the University of Georgia and Texas A&M University, both of which eliminated
legacy preferences in 2003.
57. The data are presented in two separate figures because the large variation in fundraising
numbers between the schools makes presentation in a single chart impractical. The additional vari-
ables investigated in this study (total alumni donations and total number of alumni donors) are
presented in graphical form only for the high-fundraising schools, although data for all of the
schools are presented numerically in the Appendix.
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Another measure of university fundraising is total donations. Figure 3,
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One additional measure of university fundraising is the total number of
alumni donors.5 9 This statistic is presented in Figure 4, below, for the four
high-fundraising universities.
58. Data for all eight universities can be found in numerical form in the Appendix.
59. A closely correlated and often quoted statistic is the percentage of alumni that donate.
Because of the high correlation with total number of alumni donors, the percentage of alumni that
donate is not presented here.
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As evidenced by the preceding Figures, these eight universities have ex-
perienced increased alumni and private donations over time (Figures 1-3),
although those patterns are less apparent in the number of alumni donors
(Figure 4). This increase in donations appears to be present irrespective of
the universities' use or elimination of legacy preferences. Similarly, the total
number of alumni donors does not appear to be strongly affected by the
presence or absence of legacy preferences.
A more rigorous analysis is required, however, because it is possible that
alumni donations were influenced by some other factor, such as the econ-
omy, that obscures the impact of legacy admissions policies on university
fundraising. In order to investigate this possibility, this Note predicts what
fundraising levels would have been if legacy policies had been retained, and
then compares those predictions with actual fundraising outcomes. First,
looking solely at the years when legacy policies were present, the model
calculates the effect of an economic indicator, as well as university-specific
fixed effects, on each fundraising variable. Specifically, fundraising out-
come is regressed on the S&P 500 average and dummy variables for each
university. The coefficients from this regression are then used to predict
[Vol. 108:577
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fundraising statistics for the post-legacy years. Finally, these predictions are
compared with the observed fundraising outcomes in each year, calculating
a residual (actual value minus observed value) for each observation.
The following box plots present the residuals obtained through the pre-
ceding analyses. The average residual for the legacy years is, by definition,
zero. A post-legacy residual of zero would indicate that eliminating legacy
preferences had no effect on university fundraising outcomes. A negative
post-legacy residual would indicate that legacy preferences had a positive
impact on fundraising; a positive residual would indicate that legacy prefer-
ences did not have a positive impact on fundraising (and could, potentially,
have had a negative impact on fundraising). It is impossible to do a statisti-
cal analysis to determine whether the post-legacy residuals are significantly
different from the legacy-period residuals because of dependency problems;
the following box plots instead provide a graphical depiction of the results
without introducing the bias that would be inherent in a more formal test.
The shaded box represents the 25th and 75th percentiles of the data, and the
solid line within the box represents the median residual value. The closer the
post-legacy median value is to zero, and the more that the shaded boxes
span similar ranges, the less likely that legacy preferences had an impact on
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The results presented in Figures 5-7 suggest that legacy preferences do
not have a systematic positive effect on university fundraising outcomes
because the post-legacy median residuals are near zero and the shaded boxes
representing the legacy and post-legacy periods span similar ranges. While
post-legacy total alumni donations, shown in Figure 5, are slightly below
their predicted value, Figures 6 and 7 show that the other measures of fund-
raising (post-legacy total private donations and the total number of alumni
donors, respectively) are slightly higher than their predicted values. Because
post-legacy fundraising outcomes are higher than predicted for two of the
three fundraising outcomes, and close to the predicted value in the third, the
data suggest that legacy preferences do not have a positive effect on fund-
raising outcomes.
Similarly, in all three figures, the shaded boxes (representing the 25th
and 75th percentiles of the data) overlap significantly between the legacy
period and the post-legacy period, suggesting that much of the observed
difference between legacy and post-legacy residuals is due to chance. These
results, therefore, indicate that legacy policies do not have a systematic posi-
tive impact on university fundraising outcomes.
IV. LEGACY PREFERENCES AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits educational institutions that re-
ceive federal funds from engaging in practices with disparate racial effects
unless those practices actually further a legitimate purpose. 6° The courts em-
ploy a burden-shifting standard to determine whether a federally funded
61university has violated this prohibition. Under this standard, the plaintiff
first bears the burden of showing that a facially neutral policy has a racially
discriminatory effect. If the plaintiff meets this burden, the defendant then
has the burden to prove a legitimate justification. If the defendant succeeds,
the burden returns to the plaintiff to show either (1) that the defendant's
stated reason is actually pretext for discrimination, or (2) that an equally
effective alternative practice exists that would result in less racial dispropor-
tionality.62 This Part argues that legacy preferences at federally funded
educational institutions support a claim of disparate impact discrimination
and, thus, violate the Civil Rights Act of 1964, because they do not actually
promote a legitimate purpose.
60. See supra note 10. Legacy policies implemented with a discriminatory purpose, such as
the original legacy policy at Yale, would also be impermissible under the Civil Rights Act's prohibi-
tion on intentional discrimination. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001).
However, such policies could presumably be cleansed of their discriminatory purpose by repealing
and reinstating them; therefore, this section focuses on the discriminatory effects of legacy prefer-
ences because those effects are not so easily eliminated.
61. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. New York, 655 N.E.2d 661, 669 (N.Y. 1995).
62. See id.
63. Title VI disparate impact cases do not support a private cause of action. Instead, such a
claim would be brought by the United States Department of Education Office for Civil Rights. See
Alexander, 532 U.S. 275.
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In determining whether a policy supports a prima facie case of disparate
impact discrimination, "[s]tatistics comparing benefit distribution or access
patterns among members of the protected class and the overall population
play a key role in demonstrating an adverse racial impact."' 4 In Campaign
for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. New York, for example, a prima facie case of dispa-
rate impact discrimination was established by showing that the percentage
of educational funding allocated to a group of minority students was lower
than the analogous percentage of educational funding allocated to the stu-
dent population overall.6
Legacy preferences support a prima facie case of disparate impact dis-
crimination because they disproportionately assist white applicants at the
expense of their nonwhite counterparts-an effect that is reflected in statis-
tical analysis of university admissions data.6 Under the standard articulated
in Campaign for Fiscal Equity, such statistical discrepancies state a prima
61facie case of discrimination. Indeed, in one of the few investigations of the
racial impact of legacy preferences, the United States Department of Educa-
tion Office for Civil Rights concluded that the statistical discrepancy in
Asian American legacy applicants at Harvard did support a prima facie case
68of discrimination.
Universities employing legacy admissions policies argue that they would
be able to meet their burden under the second prong of the burden-shifting
standard on the theory that such policies are beneficial fundraising tools.
69
Indeed, courts are generally deferential to universities in allowing them to
structure admissions practices according to their educational mission. In an
affirmative action case, for example, the court in Farmer v. Ramsay stated
that "courts are ill-advised to serve as super-admissions committees, replac-
ing schools' professional judgments with their own."7° Similarly, the U.S.
Supreme Court has said that judges "may not override [a genuinely aca-
64. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 655 N.E.2d at 670. Note that, in determining whether an
admissions policy creates a disparate racial impact, that policy is evaluated on its own rather than in
conjunction with other policies that arguably counterbalance the disparate racial impact. Therefore,
the disparate racial impact of legacy preferences would be evaluated independently. See, e.g., Knight
v. Alabama, 787 F. Supp. 1030, 1163-65 (N.D. Ala. 1991) (evaluating the use of the ACT in univer-
sity admissions in the context of a Title VI disparate impact suit), affd in part, 14 F.3d 1534 (11 th
Cir. 1994).
65. 655 N.E.2dat670-71.
66. See supra Part II.
67. 655 N.E.2d at 670-71.
68. OCR STATEMENT OF FINDINGS, supra note 32, at 40 ("Because of the disparate impact
that these preferences have on Asian Americans, however, OCR proceeded to analyze the legitimacy
of their use in the admissions process."). The Harvard investigation was triggered by complaints
from the Asian American community that Asian American applicants were being admitted at lower
rates than Caucasian applicants. The OCR eventually cleared Harvard of wrongdoing and closed its
investigation. For further discussion of this investigation, see id.; and infra text accompanying notes
74, 79-80.
69. OCR STATEMENT OF FINDINGS, supra note 32.
70. 159 F. Supp. 2d 873, 886 (D. Md. 2001) (rejecting a white medical school applicant's
claim of racial discrimination in the affirmative action context).
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demic decision] unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted aca-
demic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did
not actually exercise professional judgment."71 In the legacy admissions con-
text, one district court gave a one-paragraph analysis of the issue, taking a
highly deferential attitude toward the university:
Plaintiff also attacks the policy of the University whereby children of
out-of-state alumni are exempted from the stiffer academic requirements
necessary for out-of-state admission. Again, since no suspect criteria or
fundamental interests are involved, the State need only show a rational ba-
sis for the distinction. In unrebutted affidavits, defendants showed that the
alumni provide monetary support for the University and that out-of-state
alumni contribute close to one-half of the total given. To grant children of
this latter group a preference then is a reasonable basis and is not constitu-
tionally defective. Plaintiff's attack on this policy is, therefore, rejected.
72
In general, therefore, courts tend to defer to universities' policies and educa-
tional decisions.
The United States Department of Education Office for Civil Rights, the
administrative agency responsible for handling complaints in this area, also
took a deferential approach when it investigated Harvard's legacy admis-
sions policies. After a superficial analysis, the Office for Civil Rights stated
that "[i]nformation submitted [by Harvard] indicated that alumni provide the
bulk of the scholarship funds provided to all students" and "serve on the
Schools and Scholarship Committee and other alumni organizations. 73
Without analyzing the link between such contributions and legacy prefer-
ences, OCR concluded that "Harvard asserted, and OCR accepts, that there
are no alternatives to these preferences that could effectively accomplish the
same legitimate goals. 74
Although courts are generally deferential to universities in setting their
own policies, such deference is inappropriate in the context of a Title VI
claim where a prima facie case of disparate racial impact has been shown.
Universities that receive federal funds are subject to Title VI's burden-
shifting framework; the university's burden in the second stage requires it to
present evidence showing the relationship between legacy preference and a
legitimate goal. Indeed, the defendant's burden in Title VI discriminatory
impact cases is heavy. According to Larry P v. Riles, "Once a plaintiff has
established a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to
demonstrate that the requirement which caused the disproportionate impact
was required by educational necessity."75 In order to meet their burden,
71. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985) (concerning the con-
text of a student contesting expulsion from a university).
72. Rosenstock v. Bd. of Governors of the Univ. of N.C., 423 E Supp. 1321, 1327
(M.D.N.C. 1976). In Rosenstock, the plaintiff did not assert that legacy preferences had a disparate
racial impact. Id. at 1326.
73. OCR STATEMENT OF FINDINGS, supra note 32, at 41.
74. Id. at 43.
75. 793 F2d 969, 982 (9th Cir. 1984).
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universities must produce evidence demonstrating a relationship between
legacy policies and fundraising (or another legitimate goal).
The Riles court emphasized the weight of the defendant's burden by dis-
16tinguishing disparate impact claims from disparate treatment claims. In
contrast to disparate treatment claims, where the burden of proof remains
with the plaintiff although the burden of production shifts to the defendant,
in disparate impact claims the burden of proof itself shifts. The burden is
then "on the defendant to prove that the challenged action was required by
employment or educational necessity."77
Under this standard, the Department of Education Office for Civil
Rights was unduly deferential to Harvard in its investigation of Harvard's
legacy admissions policy. In that investigation, the Office for Civil Rights
allowed the university to meet its burden without providing evidence of any
actual link between fundraising (or another legitimate university goal) and
legacy preferences." Indeed, the Office for Civil Rights originally asked
Harvard to justify its legacy admissions policy and provide evidence linking
that justification to actual fundraising data. Rather than providing that
analysis, Harvard stated that it "had never studied the effect of admitting or
rejecting alumni children and that such a question was 'not something that
would lend itself to statistical analysis.' "9 Despite originally requesting evi-
dence substantiating that link, the Office for Civil Rights eventually
accepted Harvard's unsubstantiated assertion.' °
The statistical evidence presented above indicates that the relationship
between university fundraising and legacy admissions policies does lend
itself to statistical analysis and suggests that no positive link exists between
legacy preferences and alumni fundraising. This statistical evidence suggests
that, under the Title VI disparate impact framework, universities employing
legacy policies would be unable to meet their burden of proof that legacy
policies actually promote fundraising goals."' Therefore, because legacy
76. Id. at982n.10.
77. Id.; see also Young v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 922 E Supp. 544, 549 (M.D.
Ala. 1996) (citing Ga. State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417-18
(11th Cir. 1985)) (noting that the burden of proof in Title VI cases mirrors the burden-shifting
framework of Title VII, and stating that the burden of proof shifts to the defendant after the plaintiff
has stated a prima facie case).
78. Scott Jaschik, Doubts are Raised About U.S. Inquiry on Harvard Policies, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 6, 1991, at A19 (discussing the OCR investigation into Harvard's admissions
policies). It seems that no court has considered this question directly because no private right of
action exists under Title VI. In Rosenstock v. Board of Governors of the University of North Caro-
lina, the plaintiff alleged that legacy preferences violated due process and equal protection. 423 F.
Supp. 1321, 1322-23 (M.D.N.C. 1976). The court found no suspect class or fundamental interest
and concluded that the university's unrebutted affidavit stating that alumni donate to the university
satisfied the rational basis test. Id. at 1325-27.
79. Jaschik, supra note 78.
80. Id.
81. Even deferring to the university at the second stage, legacy policies could be shown to be
impermissible at the third stage, in which a plaintiff must propose an equally effective alternative
policy. Here, because legacy preferences have no demonstrable impact on alumni donations, remov-
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preferences have a disparate racial impact and they have not been shown to
further any legitimate university objective, such preferences are impermissi-
ble under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
CONCLUSION
Legacy preferences are a common component of university admissions
programs that give a boost to applicants whose parents or grandparents at-
tended a particular institution. Such preferences have a negative impact on
minority and immigrant applicants, whose parents often did not attend col-
lege in the United States. This effect motivated the nation's first legacy
preferences, which were implemented at Yale in the 1920s to limit the num-
ber of Jewish students.
Universities that employ legacy preferences often justify those prefer-
ences by arguing that they improve fundraising outcomes. But the statistical
analysis presented in this Note suggests that legacy preferences do not posi-
tively impact university fundraising. Because legacy preferences generate a
disparate racial impact without any demonstrated benefit for a legitimate
university goal, legacy preferences at federally funded universities represent
impermissible disparate impact discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of
1964.
ing the legacy preferences altogether could be considered an "equally effective alternative proposal"
under this third stage.
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APPENDIX
TABLE Al: TOTAL ANNUAL ENROLLMENT, BY UNIVERSITY (1991-2009)2
UNIVERSITY 1991
Texas A&M University 41,171
Univ of California, Berkeley 30,638
Univ of California, Davis 23,898
Univ of California, Irvine 16,817
Univ of California, Los Angeles 36,427
Univ of California, San Diego 17,797
Univ of California, Santa Barbara 18,391
University of Georgia 28,395
UNIVERSITY 1997
Texas A&M University 43,995
Univ of California, Berkeley 29,797
Univ of California, Davis 23,931
Univ of California, Irvine 17,802
Univ of California, Los Angeles 35,594
Univ of California, San Diego 18,110
Univ of California, Santa Barbara 18,531
University of Georgia 29,404
UNIVERSITY 2003
Texas A&M University 46,369
Univ of California, Berkeley 33,145
Univ of California, Davis 29,087
Univ of California, Irvine 24,874
Univ of California, Los Angeles 37,599
Univ of California, San Diego 23,528
Univ of California, Santa Barbara 20,559























































82. Fiscal year 1990 has been omitted due to incomplete data availability. Data on university
enrollment and all fundraising statistics were provided by the Council for Aid to Education, Volun-
tary Support of Education Survey. These data are available by subscription from the Council for Aid
to Education, http://www.cae.org/content/pro-datatrends.htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2008). Data for
the years 1990-1998 are not available online and were obtained through direct communication with
the organization. Stock market data used in this analysis were obtained from Yahoo! Finance,
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TABLES A2-A9: FUNDRAISING DATA BY SCHOOL83
TABLE A2: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY
TOTAL TOTAL NUMBER OF
ALUMNI PRIVATE ALUMNI LEGACY
YEAR DONATIONS DONATIONS DONORS PREFERENCE
1990 21609595 97397641 Yes
1991 24094879 117700000 29178 Yes
1992 28273248 105000000 32159 Yes
1993 34957146 128600000 28353 Yes
1994 26376025 99214128 27183 Yes
1995 29774337 103100000 31150 Yes
1996 40048689 141800000 34119 Yes
1997 57586111 181100000 32036 Yes
1998 68052976 187600000 32624 Yes
1999 80132456 184200000 34266 No
2000 56860465 166800000 33955 No
2001 95309834 202600000 31079 No
2002 96226830 223300000 30424 No
2003 80523404 190700000 32528 No
2004 66759297 178000000 33535 No
2005 64976293 198900000 34228 No
2006 81950054 246000000 33625 No
2007 83893361 242600000 35073 No
2008 70450327 285300000 35927 No
TABLE A3:
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS
TOTAL TOTAL NUMBER OF
ALUMNI PRIVATE ALUMNI LEGACY
YEAR DONATIONS DONATIONS DONORS PREFERENCE
1990 3866301 28171603 6861 Yes
1991 1795582 25427443 8761 Yes
1992 1997377 23698768 12322 Yes
1993 1864326 27475641 9281 Yes
1994 1930337 29002479 8948 Yes
1995 1697813 33689933 9029 Yes
1996 2613878 55624149 7127 Yes
1997 2433428 40955566 8835 Yes
1998 5848536 48509696 15054 Yes
1999 2989560 53228940 13398 No
2000 3265614 76768110 10417 No
2001 2354825 73286096 11880 No
2002 3215803 81868505 13275 No
83. Legacy preference data are borrowed from Steve D. Shadowen et al., No Distinctions
Except Those Which Merit Originates: The Unlawfulness of Legacy Preferences in Public and
Private Universities, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 51 (2009). These data are available at http://
law.scu.edulawreview/legacynationalcolleges.cfm (last visited Sept. 28, 2009). All fundraising
statistics were provided by the Council for Aid to Education, Voluntary Support of Education Sur-
vey. See supra note 82.
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TOTAL TOTAL NUMBER OF
ALUMNI PRIVATE ALUMNI LEGACY
YEAR DONATIONS DONATIONS DONORS PREFERENCE
2003 2713940 64663862 12748 No
2004 2707038 82343776 12658 No
2005 3144367 99717733 13020 No
2006 6758144 77670221 15367 No
2007 6137086 94730493 14726 No
2008 11383585 99952007 13968 No
TABLE A4:
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE
TOTAL TOTAL NUMBER OF
ALUMNI PRIVATE ALUMNI LEGACY
YEAR DONATIONS DONATIONS DONORS PREFERENCE
1990 442151 26544063 4455 Yes
1991 432986 20621768 5993 Yes
1992 506107 20756203 6118 Yes
1993 405150 22325432 5620 Yes
1994 1956858 21114001 5391 Yes
1995 430627 21654227 4723 Yes
1996 637452 24071882 2731 Yes
1997 738724 26726016 3098 Yes
1998 1336703 30968012 2805 Yes
1999 1196778 48545446 3369 No
2000 1056533 67254156 3303 No
2001 1076805 48490306 3724 No
2002 1392797 38900817 3887 No
2003 1696464 53225684 3915 No
2004 1352131 51807867 3481 No
2005 3651176 54568565 4860 No
2006 6029348 84075243 8142 No
2007 2211302 74237001 9594 No
2008 2556436 92279894 5862 No
TABLE A5:
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, Los ANGELES
TOTAL TOTAL NUMBER OF
ALUMNI PRIVATE ALUMNI LEGACY
YEAR DONATIONS DONATIONS DONORS PREFERENCE
1990 8394596 96454560 21282 Yes
1991 5693087 63973287 29515 Yes
1992 7437553 90372535 16266 Yes
1993 6023969 740409a4 17420 Yes
1994 11557708 90895459 30290 Yes
1995 14386537 98163606 31279 Yes
1996 22227530 139800000 32967 Yes
1997 27033257 197800000 32816 Yes
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TOTAL TOTAL NUMBER OF
ALUMNI PRIVATE ALUMNI LEGACY
YEAR DONATIONS DONATIONS DONORS PREFERENCE
1998 24782191 197200000 30014 Yes
1999 62397182 208200000 37056 No
2000 61300609 253800000 31116 No
2001 44675003 263700000 26966 No
2002 18674896 282300000 28489 No
2003 76950159 319500000 28686 No
2004 29348834 262100000 29196 No
2005 33370148 281600000 31013 No
2006 49206899 319600000 30093 No
2007 78668367 364800000 29760 No
2008 58324665 456700000 31220 No
TABLE A6:
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO
TOTAL TOTAL NUMBER OF
ALUMNI PRIVATE ALUMNI LEGACY
YEAR DONATIONS DONATIONS DONORS PREFERENCE
1990 5397771 49319254 4237 Yes
1991 358375 45628500 5632 Yes
1992 502329 29858096 5817 Yes
1993 464150 77333862 5077 Yes
1994 617420 49712935 4044 Yes
1995 482080 41119623 4121 Yes
1996 783750 64683330 7236 Yes
1997 592058 88113717 4949 Yes
1998 1127961 69494401 5305 Yes
1999 2239502 114700000 4488 No
2000 2041335 112800000 4966 No
2001 2004006 93631920 5724 No
2002 1380571 101200000 5520 No
2003 1458976 138600000 6459 No
2004 1603386 100900000 7187 No
2005 2554088 126000000 7749 No
2006 2467780 184900000 8152 No
2007 2044630 134100000 7585 No
2008 2210830 121800000 5342 No
TABLE A7:
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA BARBARA
TOTAL TOTAL NUMBER OF
ALUMNI PRIVATE ALUMNI LEGACY
YEAR DONATIONS DONATIONS DONORS PREFERENCE
1990 353392 7959021 4673 Yes
1991 449696 17500867 4366 Yes
1992 920842 12642011 5462 Yes
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TOTAL TOTAL NUMBER OF
ALUMNI PRIVATE ALUMNI LEGACY
YEAR DONATIONS DONATIONS DONORS PREFERENCE
1993 887178 12547299 6462 Yes
1994 832127 21293576 7077 Yes
1995 890103 6824937 5574 Yes
1996 1506135 17385456 5733 Yes
1997 1058532 18235667 5733 Yes
1998 1400844 14826747 9155 Yes
1999 1080137 19435133 8819 No
2000 2944637 24110792 8434 No
2001 3881697 29994032 8915 No
2002 2690420 26679988 8553 No
2003 1285489 62017178 7938 No
2004 2892963 73966187 8956 No
2005 3224530 48882168 9493 No
2006 7123713 55566230 8845 No
2007 5263055 51259343 8134 No
2008 6760137 90212348 7915 No
TABLE A8:
UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA
TOTAL TOTAL NUMBER OF
ALUMNI PRIVATE ALUMNI LEGACY
YEAR DONATIONS DONATIONS DONORS PREFERENCE
1990 15205590 28151097 24416 Yes
1991 6955903 23271353 25678 Yes
1992 7555536 25849160 31053 Yes
1993 24426447 42140162 34072 Yes
1994 9580772 30247646 33910 Yes
1995 8276900 29201109 34499 Yes
1996 11003220 31013391 33728 Yes
1997 40809975 65886778 34772 Yes
1998 14568836 41272130 31963 Yes
1999 12434181 42534143 32087 Yes
2000 15224281 45738870 34009 Yes
2001 13305549 43602733 33231 Yes
2002 21927338 57831973 33952 Yes
2003 23400153 59073376 33709 No
2004 24227010 60560316 34574 No
2005 22358445 60529358 32981 No
2006 28250192 69482991 31023 No
2007 36336333 88433680 31150 No
2008 30590687 77131049 31689 No
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TABLE A9:
TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY
TOTAL TOTAL NUMBER OF
ALUMNI PRIVATE ALUMNI LEGACY
YEAR DONATIONS DONATIONS DONORS PREFERENCE
1990 25181088 50817143 36377 Yes
1991 18830130 44713243 44890 Yes
1992 29162142 59893384 53731 Yes
1993 26202379 90185178 42165 Yes
1994 33059868 91725560 45251 Yes
1995 17615014 74816474 44867 Yes
1996 27771998 110100000 45741 Yes
1997 42300774 106600000 39896 Yes
1998 41979507 150700000 46732 Yes
1999 35010360 123600000 43870 Yes
2000 41748147 110400000 42337 Yes
2001 36421934 114500000 42231 Yes
2002 48537768 118200000 41750 Yes
2003 42279610 142300000 40413 No
2004 32402950 103500000 45129 No
2005 55939037 144500000 41885 No
2006 60561375 145800000 44128 No
2007 71838212 168500000 43526 No
2008 88915850 206700000 85509 No

